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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment remains one of the most vital and relevant areas of
constitutional law, since the "right... against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures'l can touch our lives in a number of ways. Almost everyone has been on
the receiving end of law enforcement's attention, or knows someone who
has-whether in a customs inquiry, a stop for a traffic violation, or a full pat-
down search-and therefore knows that it is a nerve-wracking experience at
best. Those applying the Fourth Amendment, such as law enforcement officials
or prosecutors, also know that complying with the Fourth Amendment often
requires hard decisions under pressure in areas where the courts themselves are
unclear. From either perspective, the Fourth Amendment is a complex and
central part of the interaction between citizens and the government.
This centrality means that judicial treatment of the Fourth Amendment af-
fects wide areas of society. While individual cases may, on their own, seem in-
significant outside of their narrow holdings, in context, they may signal broad
changes in the way courts value privacy, law enforcement, and their interac-
tions. This Developments in Policy Article therefore assesses the current state
of the Fourth Amendment by examining the Supreme Court's October 1999
Term.
First, the Article provides an overview of the Court's recent Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, which has been steadily tilting in favor of law en-
forcement. Then, it analyzes each of the October 1999 Term's Fourth Amend-
ment cases. Two of these cases ask what a person can reasonably expect to be
private: Flippo v. West Virginia2 examines warrantless searches of crime
scenes, while Bond v. United States3 examines luggage squeezing. The other
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Flippo v. West Virginia, 120 S. Ct. 7 (1999).
3. Bond v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1462 (2000).
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two consider the contours of investigatory "stop and frisks" under Terry v.
Ohio4: lllinois v. Wardlow5 inquires whether flight from law enforcement jus-
tifies a Terry stop, while Florida v. .J.L.6 asks the same question regarding
anonymous tips. Finally, the Article analyzes the cases, arguing that the Su-
preme Court has not-contrary to first appearances--changed its approach to
the Fourth Amendment, but continues to value law enforcement's interests
more highly than individuals' privacy interests. It suggests that these outcomes
are strongly influenced by a deference to precedent; where precedent is no
guide, they are influenced by a tendency for the Court to examine the facts
through the eyes of only some of the characters involved. Finally, the Article
concludes with a look at the Fourth Amendment cases before the Court in the
October 2000 Term.
II. BACKGROUND
To evaluate the significance of the October 1999 Term, it is necessary to
know the context in which the cases were heard. This section thus provides an
overview of the Supreme Court's evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
of which the central issue is the definition of reasonable. In recent decisions,
the Court appears to have shifted how it determines what is reasonable: It fo-
cuses less on the individual's expectation of privacy and affords greater defer-
ence to law enforcement interests.
A. Justice Harlan's "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Formulation
The Fourth Amendment functions as the cornerstone of protection against
unjustified government intrusions into the privacy of citizens. 7 Widespread
agreement exists among criminal procedure scholars that the central purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect privacy, and that the protection should in-
crease as the privacy intrusion increases.8 By proscribing "unreasonable
searches and seizures," the Amendment ensures that unreasonable government
intrusions do not interfere with our lives.
Although individual privacy rights stand at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment, an individual's interest in her privacy is not absolute: The government
4. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
6. Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000).
7. The complete text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.




interest in effective law enforcement also determines reasonableness. For in-
stance, if a sufficiently strong government interest exists, a warrantless search
can pass constitutional muster, even if the search intrudes on an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Herein lies the most formidable challenge of
the Fourth Amendment-striking the appropriate balance between an individ-
ual's privacy interest and the government's interest in detecting illegal activity.
The Court set forth the appropriate criteria for this balancing test in the
1960s, when the nation began to experience "an explosion of national concern
over gaining control over [the] growing ability of the government and private
investigators to snoop." 9 As a result, the Court ushered in an era of enhanced
deference to the individual. One of the first cases signaling this new approach
was Silverman v. United States.10 In Silverman, the Court held that warrantless
eavesdropping via an electronic device violated the Fourth Amendment," be-
cause the device invaded the occupant's premises.' 2 This preoccupation with
privacy invasion would characterize the Court's Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence for the next two decades.
The most significant jurisprudential shift, however, came in 1967 with Jus-
tice Harlan's concurrence in the seminal Fourth Amendment case, Katz v.
United States.'3 In Katz, the Court held it unconstitutional for law enforcement
agents to plant an eavesdropping device outside a public telephone booth.
14
The main significance of Katz derives from Justice Harlan's "expectation of
privacy" test for warrantless searches. Harlan wrote that the Fourth Amend-
ment imposes a twofold requirement: "first that a person have exhibited an ac-
tual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."" 5 This test affords great
deference to societal norms, as only private areas recognized by society are
protected by the Amendment. Harlan clarified these two requirements when he
distinguished between the home and open areas:
Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are
not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unrea-
sonable. 16'
Harlan's formulation quickly emerged as the standard for evaluating Fourth
9. GiNi GRAHAM ScoTT, MIND YOUR OWN BUSINESS: THE BATTLE FOR PERSONAL PRIVACY 62 (1995).
10. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
11. Id. at 510-12.
12. Id.
13. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Id. at 350-53.
15. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
16. Id. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)).
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Amendment reasonableness. 
17
Post-Katz decisions have focused on the privacy invasion to determine
whether a search or seizure violated a "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Harlan's approach has produced fairly predictable and logical results. Since
people generally expect privacy in certain types of spaces, as Harlan noted, the
law tends to focus on the area a person is in when protecting that expectation.
People also expect greater privacy in certain places and areas; for that reason,
"the law affords a kind of graded protection to individual privacy."' 18 In the
words of one commentator, "[e]xpectations of privacy that society is prepared
to recognize as legitimate have, at least in theory, the greatest protection; di-
minished expectations of privacy are more easily invaded; and subjective ex-
pectations of privacy that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate
have no protection."'9
Several decisions reflect these gradations. The area of greatest privacy ex-
pectation is one's home, embodied in the long-standing principle that a "man's
home is his castle." 20 Consequently, police can search a private home only if
they have probable cause and a warrant obtained in advance. 2 1 Similarly, the
Fourth Amendment protects a guest when visiting the home of another because
22of the guest's high expectation of privacy.
The home has the greatest level of privacy expectation; all other areas in-
voke a weaker level of expectation. For example, as the Court observed in
South Dakota v. Opperman,23 while persons have a privacy interest in their
cars, "the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is signifi-
cantly less than that relating to one's home., 24 Searches of cars, therefore, can
be made if the officer has probable cause to believe the car contains evidence
17. Although a concurrence, Justice Harlan's opinion has been relied upon more heavily than the
majority opinion, and Harlan's "reasonable expectation of privacy" test has been embraced as "the pri-
mary framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment challenges." Aaron Larks-Stanford, Comment, The
Warrantless Use of Thermal Imaging and "Intimate Details": Why Growing Pot Indoors and Washing
Dishes Are Similar Activities Under the Fourth Amendment, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 575, 583 (2000) (cita-
tions omitted); Andrew D. Morton, Comment, Much Ado About Newsgathering: Personal Privacy, Law
Enforcement, and the Law of Unintended Consequences for Anti-Paparazzi Legislation, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 1435, 1459 (1999) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125 (2d
ed. 1992)).
18. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 1265-66.
19. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Secu-
rity?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 331 (1998) (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
20. E.g., DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 85-88 (1972) (discussing
the historical acceptance of the tenet that a "man's home is his castle").
21. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 395 (1978).
22. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Jones
established the proposition that "a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his
own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusions into
that place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1978).
23. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
24. Id, at 367 (footnote omitted). Examples of the reduced privacy expectation in automobiles are
the subjection of cars to pervasive and continuing regulation, inspection, and police stops. Id. at 367-68.
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of a crime, a lower standard than for searches of homes.25 When the privacy
expectation is even lower than the expectation in a car, reasonable suspicion
alone will justify a search. For instance, Terry v. Ohio26 held that police offi-
cers can stop and frisk a person if they have reasonable suspicion of some
criminal activity and that the person may be armed.27 People have a lower ex-
pectation of privacy in items kept on their person than in items secured in their
car, which, in turn, is lower than in items secured in their home.
Most post-Katz decisions denying the existence of a "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" make some logical sense. For example, while a person has a
legitimate privacy expectation in her own possessions left in her own car,28 she
likely expects little privacy if she leaves her belongings in someone else's car,
and indeed, the Court has refused to recognize a legitimate privacy expectation
in that situation.29 Likewise, a person's trash abandoned at the curb is not con-
sidered private: "It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scaven-
gers, snoops, and other members of the public." 3° For similar reasons, objects
and activities occurring in open fields do not have a legitimate privacy expec-
tation. 31 Prisoners lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in items in their
32 3cells, since prisoners retain a diminished expectation of privacy in general.33
Finally, although a person might have a strong privacy expectation in her
phone conversations, 34 she has no privacy expectation in the mere numbers
dialed.35
B. The Rehnquist Court's Shift
In recent years, however, the pendulum has swung away from Katz.3 6 The
Rehnquist Court has embraced a critical modification of Harlan's formulation.
While maintaining the same terminology of balancing the privacy intrusion and
the government interest, recent decisions have afforded greater leeway to the
25. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
26. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27. Id. at 20-27.
28. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
29. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).
30. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,40 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
31. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1981).
32. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
33. Several decisions have affirmed that prisoners forfeit certain rights because of their criminal
acts, and, as a consequence, retain a diminished privacy interest. E.g., Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,
307 (4th Cir. 1992) (observing that prisoners enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy); People v.
Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1136 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) (observing that sex offenders have a minimal pri-
vacy interest in their own identity).
34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979).
36. Morton, supra note 17, at 1460-64.
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government interest. Initially, this balancing began by looking at the individual
whose privacy interest may have been violated; the analysis in modem deci-
sions, however, seems to look from the perspective of the law enforcement
agents whose actions are challenged. One commentator has observed that the
Court, in assessing the privacy expectation, seems more focused on the subject
matter of the case. 37 As a consequence, individual privacy rights have become
less relevant in criminal investigations.
38
The Court's 1989 decision in Florida v. Riley39 seemed to mark the begin-
ning of this doctrinal shift. Riley reviewed a warrantless search in which police,
traveling in a helicopter at an altitude of roughly 400 feet, peered into a green-
house in an individual's backyard and detected marijuana plants.40 In uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the search, the Court clearly departed from the spirit
of Harlan's "expectation of privacy" test. Writing for the majority, Justice
White acknowledged that the defendant "no doubt intended and expected that
his greenhouse would not be open to public inspection, and the precautions he
took protected against ground-level observation." 4' Yet, White opined that
"[b]ecause the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left partially open ....
[the defendant] could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was
protected from public or official observation from a helicopter had it been fly-
ing within the navigable airspace for fixed-wing aircraft. ' '42 Thus, the Riley
Court seemed to examine the defendant's "expectation of privacy" more from
law enforcement's perspective than from the defendant's perspective.
Automobile stops are one area in which the Court's jurisprudential shift has
been particularly evident. In the mid-1990s, the Court handed down two deci-
sions involving automobile stops that afforded enhanced deference to law en-
43 44forcement interests. Ohio v. Robinette addressed the search of a car after a
traffic stop. The Court held that, although the police never informed the sus-
pect he could decline the search and depart,45 the search was nonetheless vol-
37. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1370.
38. One judge has suggested that the Court's increased deference to law enforcement should not be
surprising in light of the country's war on drugs. Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: Development of
the Law of Search and Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1999).
39. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
40. Id. at 448-49.
41. Id. at 450. In this sense, Riley is different from California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), an
earlier marijuana-growing case that also upheld an aerial observation. In Ciraolo, the Court stated that a
ten-foot fence around a backyard may have "manifested a subjective expectation of privacy from all
observations of [the defendant's] backyard, or... merely a hope that no one would observe his unlawful
gardening." Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211-12. Ciraolo clearly foreshadows Riley, but it stopped short of
stating that the defendant had exhibited an actual expectation against public inspection.
42. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450-51.
43. For a more detailed discussion of these cases and their impact, see generally David A. Sklan-
sky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV.
271 (1997).
44. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
45. Id. at 35-36.
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46untary and, therefore, permissible under the Fourth Amendment. In the other
case, Maryland v. Wilson,47 the Court considered whether a police officer,
during a traffic stop, has the authority to order passengers out of the car. 48 The
Court upheld the search, noting that the "additional intrusion on the passenger
is minimal ' 49 and "the same weighty interest in officer safety is present re-
gardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger."
50
More than any other recent Term, the October 1998 Term demonstrated
this increased deference to law enforcement interests. The Court addressed
several cases invoking Fourth Amendment issues. With two exceptions, the
Court's rulings were pro-law enforcement. Moreover, both decisions favoring
the privacy interest contained law enforcement interests that were either weak
or less than obvious.
Minnesota v. Carter51 perhaps best demonstrates the Court's new direc-
tion. In Carter, the Court held that while in the apartment of a business ac-
quaintance, a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy;52 this
was a step back from the 1990 Minnesota v. Olson,53 which held that an over-
night guest does have a legitimate expectation of privacy when in someone
else's home. 54 Olson more closely resembled Justice Harlan's approach to
Fourth Amendment scrutiny and was very restrictively interpreted in Carter.
Additionally, the Court in Carter observed that because the case involved a
commercial transaction, the expectation of privacy was diminished.5 5 It is not
clear why such a sharp difference exists between overnight guests and non-
overnight guests. In both situations, the host has invited another person into his
home, is present in the home with the guest, and is engaged in consensual ac-
tivity. Societal expectations seem to indicate that a non-overnight guest has ac-
quired a reasonable expectation of privacy.
56
Other cases from the 1998 Term demonstrated great deference to law en-
forcement interests by refusing to establish an expectation of privacy in sur-
prising areas. In Wyoming v. Houghton,57 the Court permitted a search of a
passenger's purse inside an automobile, claiming that the passenger had a re-
46. Id. at 35, 40. The Court opined that it would be "unrealistic to require police officers to always
inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary." Id. at 40.
47. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
48. Id. at 410-11.
49. Id. at 415.
50. Id. at 413.
51. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
52. Id. at 89-91.
53. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
54. Id. at 98-99.
55. Carter, 525 U.S. at 90-91.
56. Andrew C. White, Case Note, Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998), 10 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 621,651 (2000).
57. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
Yale Law & Policy Review
duced expectation of privacy.58 However, common experience suggests that
many women consider the contents of their purses strongly personal and pri-
vate. In addition to downplaying the privacy interest, the Court emphasized the
strong government interest in searching the purse, observing that the govern-
ment's ability to secure evidence would be "appreciably impaired" without the
ability to search all contents of the car.
59
The Court again trivialized an expectation of privacy in Florida v. White.
60
Here, the Court held that police do not need a warrant to seize an automobile if
they have probable cause to believe that the automobile is forfeitable contra-
band,61 even in the absence of exigent circumstances and if the probable cause
determination was made several months earlier.62 Justice Thomas, writing for
the Court, observed that while "the police lacked probable cause to believe that
respondent's car contained contraband, they certainly had probable cause to
believe that the vehicle itself was contraband., 63 Therefore, the Court granted
significant deference to the law enforcement interest in obtaining forfeitable
contraband and minimal deference to a person's privacy right in her property,
such as the contents of her car.
Only two decisions from the 1998 Term favored the privacy interest, and
these cases both involved circumstances where the law enforcement interest
was unclear. In Wilson v. Layne,64 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of
media "ride-alongs," in which members of the media accompany police offi-
cers during the execution of search and arrest warrants in private homes. The
Court held the "ride-alongs" unconstitutional, relying on a semblance of the
traditional approach. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court,
opined that the Fourth Amendment "embodies [a] centuries-old principle of
respect for the privacy of the home." 65 Yet, much of the opinion emphasized
that the Court was unable to find a compelling government interest for this ac-
tivity66-such as the reporters aiding in the execution of the warrant or assist-
ing the law enforcement officers in any manner 67-since if a third party can aid
law enforcement in the execution of a warrant, its presence does not violate the
58. Id. at 303.
59. Id. at 304-05.
60. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999).
61. Id. at 565-66.
62. See id. at 565.
63. Id. at 564-65 (citation omitted).
64. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
65. Id. at 610.
66. The Court rejected several justifications for the policy, most of which were based on alleged
benefits to the public and the public's right to know. The potential government interests, such as publi-
cizing law enforcement activities and the deterrent effect of televised crack-downs, were largely specu-
lative. Id. at 612-13.
67. Id. at 611.
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Fourth Amendment. 68 Wilson thus suggests that this deference to privacy
rights might be overlooked given a strong enough government interest.
Knowles v. Iowa was the other decision of the 1998 Term coming out on
the side of the privacy interest.69 In Knowles, the Court refused to extend its
"search incident to arrest" exception 70 to citations for speeding, overturning
the search of a motorcyclist who was cited for speeding but not arrested. 71 The
Court's reasoning, however, was based more on the minimal law enforcement
interest in the search than on the individual's expectation of privacy. In par-
ticular, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court; stated that the historic
72rationales for the "search incident to arrest" doctrine were not applicable. In
addition, the Court may have seen Knowles as setting limits beyond which po-
lice should not venture.
73
It is safe to conclude that the Court's recent jurisprudence, and in particular
the holdings of the 1998 Term, have seriously limited the scope of a "reason-
able expectation of privacy." It is unlikely that the Katz Court would have ar-
rived at the same result as the Rehnquist Court in some recent Fourth Amend-
ment cases. The current Court seems much more reluctant to apply its long-
standing presumption that warrantless seizures, in most circumstances, violate
the Fourth Amendment.74 The Court has taken a more permissive view of pri-
vacy invasions,75 as it seems far more preoccupied with the law enforcement
interest than previous Courts were. Individuals seem to retain a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" only when a government interest fails to justify in-
truding upon that privacy.
C. Looking to the Future
The Court's new approach to Fourth Amendment reasonableness has
caused some trepidation. Much like the technology explosion of the 1960s,
76
68. Id. at 612.
69. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
70. The Court carved out the "search incident to arrest" exception in United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973). In Robinson, the Court held that, in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full search of
the arrested individual is an exception to the warrant requirement and a "reasonable" search under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 224-37.
71. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 118-19.
72. The two traditional rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception are officer safety and
the preservation of evidence. Id. at 116 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234). The Court found neither ap-
plicable. First, the issuance of a citation does not invoke a "threat to officer safety" to the same level of
an arrest. Id. at 117. Second, the law enforcement interest in preserving and protecting evidence is not
present because, once the citation is issued, no evidence of excessive speed is necessary for prosecution
of the offense. Id. at 118.
73. Gillespie, supra note 38, at 22.
74. E.g., Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 568 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Larks-Stanford, supra note 17, at 588-90.
76. Supra text accompanying note 9.
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modem technology is empowering new investigative techniques,77 and thus,
privacy rights may be more important than ever. Advocates of privacy rights-
such as Justice Powel178 -fear that law enforcement's use of new surveillance
technology translates into a fierce attack on privacy rights, and therefore
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence must be modified accordingly.
79
With this shifting jurisprudence in mind, this Article now turns its attention
to the Court's October 1999 Term. In its most recent Term, the Court granted
certiorari to several cases that raised important Fourth Amendment questions.
Did the Court continue to grant broad discretion to law enforcement interests at
the expense of an individual's privacy interest? Has the Court continued to re-
treat from Katz's approach, which saw an individual's expectation of privacy
as central to a Fourth Amendment inquiry?
III. FLIPPO V. WEST VIRGINIA
Adultery, homosexuality, pornography, a lover's quarrel, and murder:
Flippo v. West Virginia80 provides all the necessary ingredients for an exten-
sion of the Court's 1978 Mincey v. Arizona81 ruling, which disallowed a mur-
der scene exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on warrantless
searches. Flippo relies strongly on Mincey's precedent in providing Fourth
Amendment protection to crime scenes--even a rented cabin where a homicide
took place-absent an emergency.
82
A. The Case and its Holding
In 1996, during a vacation in a state park with his wife, James Michael
Flippo placed a frantic 911 call to report that the couple had been attacked.83
When police arrived at the cabin where the Flippos were staying, they discov-
ered Flippo with severe wounds to his head and legs and his wife dead from a
head wound. Though Flippo was taken into custody and no emergency situa-
tion existed, the police proceeded to search the cabin for over 16 hours without
obtaining a warrant. 84 On a table near the body of Flippo's wife, the police dis-
77. SCOTT, supra note 9, at 62.
78. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 216 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
79. Larks-Stanford, supra note 17, at 575; Merrick D. Bernstein, Note, "Intimate Details": A
Troubling New Fourth Amendment Standard for Government Surveillance Techniques, 46 DUKE L.J.
575, 575-76 (1996).
80. Flippo v. West Virginia, 120 S. Ct. 7 (1999).
81. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
82. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 8.
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id.; cf State v. Faretra, 750 A.2d 166, 169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (noting that police
may make a warrantless search after a crime has taken place for the limited purpose of rendering aid to a
crime victim, apprehending the suspect, or securing the crime scene).
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covered a closed-though unlocked-briefcase.8 5 Inside were photographs of a
man in various states of undress-later alleged to be Flippo's lover and a
member of the congregation of which Flippo was a minister.8 6 At trial, the
prosecution used these photographs as evidence of Flippo's infidelity, arguing
that his wife's discovery of them supplied his motive to kill her.87 The trial
court rejected Flippo's motion to suppress the photographs as the fruit of a
warrantless search, claiming that the police officers were acting well within the
bounds of the Fourth Amendment in conducting an investigation of everything
found within the crime scene. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia denied its discretionary review of the case.
89
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the trial court. It noted that warrantless
searches by police are contrary to Fourth Amendment protections against un-
reasonable searches unless they fall within one of the narrow exceptions
spelled out in Katz v. United States.90 Although at trial West Virginia attempted
to invoke a number of exceptions to justify the search,91 specifically plain
view,92 exigent circumstances, 93 and inventory, 94 the trial court relied exclu-
sively on the presumption that it was "within the law" for police to search
"anything and everything found within the crime scene area." 95 The trial court
made no attempt to distinguish the case from Mincey, which specifically re-
jected a crime-scene exception to the requirement of a warrant before con-
ducting an extensive non-emergency search.96 In reversing the trial court, the
Court quite plainly held that Mincey controlled here, and that absent an emer-
gency situation with a person in need of immediate aid, no additional crime
scene exception to the Fourth Amendment will be recognized.97 The Court de-
clined to consider whether Flippo's 911 call to the police constituted implicit
consent to the search.98
85. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 8.
86. Id. at 7 n.1.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Flippo v. State, No. 982196 (W. Va. Jan. 13, 1999). Flippo appealed his conviction directly to
West Virginia's highest court because West Virginia has no immediate appellate court system.
90. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
91. Flippo, 120 S. Ct at 7.
92. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1978).
93. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
94. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 382-83 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
95. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 8 (citing App. A to Pet. for Cert., at 3).
96. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395.
97. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 8.
98. Id. at 9.
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B. A Fourth Amendment Analysis of Flippo: Privacy Concerns Versus Law
Enforcement Interests
The protection of privacy rights is at the core of the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requirement. In balancing the interests of individuals and law
enforcement, the Court has traditionally weighted the scales toward privacy
rights by focusing on the expectation of privacy at the time and place of the
search. Recently, however, much more deference has been paid to the law en-
forcement objectives at hand, with correspondingly less paid to the potential
intrusion into privacy. Flippo is one of the increasingly rare times when the
Court sided with privacy interests.
1. Privacy Concerns: A Closed Container Within a Cabin
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence surrounding war-
rantless searches relies heavily on the expectation of privacy that accompanies
a person's home or personal belongings. In fact, Mincey established that nei-
ther shooting a police officer nor a subsequent arrest forfeited the defendant's
privacy interest inside his apartment. 99 The Court carefully distinguished be-
tween the defendant's reduced privacy right in his person after an arrest and a
reduced right of privacy in his entire home. 00 Unlike the facts in Mincey, how-
ever, Flippo and his wife were vacationing in a cabin in a state park, not stay-
ing in their house or apartment. Thus, the privacy interest guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment, which is strongest in the home, 101 was somewhat reduced.
Further, recent jurisprudence has indicated that short-term guests1°2 lack the
same privacy expectation as long-term guests.'
0 3
However, Flippo was not a social invitee, but rather had a rental contract
for the cabin where-he and his wife were staying.' 4 Thus, the privacy interest
involved seems similar to that in a hotel room,' 0 5 and stronger than that of a
person traveling in a vehicle or walking down the street. 16 Moreover, thephotographs and negatives in question were found in a closed (but unlocked)
99. Mincey, 437 U.S at 391.
100. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969)).
101. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110(1990).
102. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (holding that a non-overnight guest lacks the
same privacy expectations as overnight guests).
103. Olson, 495 U.S. at 98 (holding that "an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy
in his host's home").
104. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 7.
105. "[W]hen a person engages a hotel room he undoubtedly gives implied or express permission
to such persons as maids, janitors or repairmen to enter his room in the performance of their duties....
[But] [n]o less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house, a guest in a hotel
room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483,489-90 (1964) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
106. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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briefcase. 10 7 Since the briefcase brings this case within the traditional jurispru-
dence of closed containers, Flippo's expectation of privacy was likely at its
maximum. °8 Even the "exploratory" touching of a soft-sided bag in an over-
head bin on a cross-country bus intrudes into a passenger's legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. 10 9 Flippo's photos were discovered in a hard-sided briefcase,
fully closed, and inside a permanent cabin, indicating a strong expectation of
privacy similar to that of Mincey. 110 This strong privacy interest and close
analogy to precedent likely weighed heavily on the Court's analysis in this
case.
2. Law Enforcement Interests: A Reasonable Search?
What remains then is whether the police officers' search' was reasonable
because of the law enforcement interest in the search. 12 Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence does create a limited crime scene exception when an emergency
situation exists because officers need to give aid to victims or apprehend the
perpetrator." 3 While the killer in Flippo could still have been at large, the po-
lice officers neither had victims that required immediate attention within the
cabin nor required entry to secure the area. 114 Two other exceptions to Fourth
Amendment search doctrine--exigent circumstances" 5 and inventory 116-also
did not apply given the non-emergency nature of the search. Finally, West Vir-
ginia argued that the plain view exception" 7 controls, and since the briefcase
107. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 7.
108. Bond v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1462 (2000).
109. Id. at 1465.
110. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 7.
111. It is undisputed that the officers' activities were a search for Fourth Amendment purposes,
because of the officers' extensive 16-hour search of the cabin and the opening of the briefcase. Flippo,
120 S. Ct. at 7.
112. The Court declined to consider whether Flippo consented to the search by calling 911. Flippo,
120 S. Ct. at 7. A very high standard exists to prove that consent to a search was obtained, especially
when the legality of the search rests on that consent. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 524 S.E.2d 171, 174
(Va. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 496 S.E.2d 143, 149-50 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)).
Namely, the state must show that the suspect voluntarily gave consent, not simply that she submitted "to
a claim of lawful authority." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497 (1983); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968). West Virginia argued that the 911 call met this standard, and therefore that the
trial court's decision should be upheld. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 8. Thus, the consent issue could have sig-
nificantly affected the constitutionality of the search, if the Court had addressed it.
113. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978); ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § SS 260.5 (Proposed Official Draft 1975); Note, The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search
and Seizure, and the Fourth Amendment, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 571, 584 n.102 (1975); see also Michi-
gan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1978); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
114. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 7.
115. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (1978).
116. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 382-83 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing
searches which are conducted not to discover evidence of a crime, but simply to itemize the contents of
an automobile or other area, as exempt from the normal Fourth Amendment search restrictions).
117. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 499 (holding that once law enforcement officers enter a building for an
emergency purpose, they may seize evidence in plain view).
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was out in the open, the search was justified. However, while the briefcase it-
self may have been out in the open, the photographs and negatives within it
certainly were not." 8 Since no exceptions to the Fourth Amendment applied,
there was only a weak law enforcement justification for a warrantless search of
Flippo's cabin. Thus, the strong privacy interest outweighed the slight law en-
forcement interest, and the Supreme Court held the search unconstitutional.
However, the law enforcement interest in searching crime scenes is very
jealously guarded by police and a number of state courts-notwithstanding the
Court's clear messages in Mincey and Flippo. Just a few months after Flippo
was decided, a New Jersey Superior Court allowed an officer to search what
turned out to be a "chop shop" garage simply because he had reason to believe
there may have been burglars inside. 119 Faretra declined to read Flippo so
broadly as to exclude shorter, plain-view searches by police, hinging its rea-
soning on the fact that the officer had made a plain-view observation of in-
criminating evidence rather than conducting an extensive warrantless search.
120
Although Faretra attempted to highlight its reliance on the plain view excep-
tion to warrantless search doctrine, ultimately its reasoning rests on the fact
that-unlike in Flippo-the search was not extensive.'
21
If Mincey is only applied to searches of a certain judicially-defined length,
then its influence will be greatly lessened. Indeed, its very existence may have
limited the protection provided in Flippo. Since the incriminating evidence in
Flippo was inside a closed container, 122 the Court had the option of basing its
decision on either or both of Mincey's prohibition of murder scene exceptions
or its closed container jurisprudence. 2 3 By relying solely on Mincey, the Court
both showed its reliance on settled precedent and chose to base its opinion on a
single form of protection for privacy rights-a form that, as seen, allows for
greater flexibility on the part of courts to continue allow law enforcement in-
terests to dominate.
C. Fourth Amendment Developments
Flippo v. West Virginia was decided per curiam, demonstrating an in-
creasingly rare consensus among the Court regarding the limits of Fourth
Amendment doctrine. This decision demonstrates two things in its three pages.
118. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. 7at8.
119. State v. Faretra, 750 A.2d 166, 171 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
120. Id.
121. Id. ("Here, we are not presented with an extensive crime scene search.... Thus the proscribed
crime-scene exception does not apply to these facts.").
122. Flippo, 120 S. Ct at 7.
123. A person who keeps an item in a closed container generally has indicated an expectation of
privacy in that item. E.g., Bond v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1462 (2000); but see Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295 (1999) (allowing the search of a car passenger's purse because of the reduced expectation
of privacy in items found in cars).
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First, it exemplifies the Court's usual concern that its precedent and institu-
tional role be respected. The trial court essentially ignored the very closely
analogous Mincey v. Arizona, an obvious error that the Court was unlikely to
allow. Second, it highlights the added protections available to persons within a
dwelling-be it an apartment or rented cabin-versus when walking on the
street or traveling within their automobiles. Flippo had the advantage of keep-
ing his photographs both within a closed container and inside his rented
cabin-a double and very traditional expectation of privacy that the Court was
unable to overlook. Notwithstanding the shortfall of Flippo-namely that the
length of the search was too highly emphasized, allowing courts to distinguish
shorter searches with Fourth Amendment violations equivalent to those here-
it does illustrate a greater degree of sympathy by the Justices for searches
within a dwelling rather than of travelers in an automobile or on the street. By
reaffirming Mincey, the Court demonstrated that upholding a non-controversial
precedent can trump its tendency to defer to law enforcement interests.
IV. BOND v. UNITED STATES
In Bond v. United States,124 Steven Dewayne Bond, a Greyhound passen-
ger, appealed his conviction on drug possession charges on the ground that
Border Patrol Agent Cantu, who discovered a brick of methamphetamine in his
bag, violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the conviction. Although this
case appears to be a noticeable departure from the Court's increasing deference
toward law enforcement interests, the result is hard to reconcile with the
Court's precedents and legal standards. While civil libertarians might applaud
the result, its potential to reshape Fourth Amendment law is substantially di-
luted by the sketchy reasoning on which the case rests and the questions it
avoids. At best, the case may prove to be nothing more than an aberration. At
worst, the analysis it employs may undermine privacy interests even more in
the long run.
A. The Facts
Following routine procedures, the Greyhound bus with Mr. Bond on board
stopped at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint in Sierra Blanca, Texas. Bor-
der Patrol Agent Cantu boarded the bus to check the passengers' immigration
status. After having satisfied himself that the passengers were lawfully in the
United States, Agent Cantu began walking toward the bus's exit. As he walked,
he squeezed passengers' soft luggage stored above the seats. As he approached
Bond's seat, he felt a bag that had "a brick-like object in it.''125 He later ex-
124. Bond v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1462 (2000).
125. Id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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plained that he felt "the edges of [a] brick in the bag."1 26 He then squeezed the
bag. Upon questioning, Bond admitted that the bag belonged to him and al-
lowed Agent Cantu to open it. Agent Cantu then discovered a brick of meth-
amphetamine wrapped in duct tape and rolled in a pair of pants. Bond was sub-
sequently charged and convicted of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine
and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
B. The Court's Opinion
The question before the Court was whether the evidence should have been
suppressed due to Agent Cantu's warrantless search. The Court answered in
the affirmative, with two Justices dissenting, holding that the manipulation of
the bag was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, wrote that because Bond used an
opaque bag and placed it directly above his seat, he had exhibited an actual ex-
pectation of privacy. 127 That expectation, moreover, was "one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable."' 128 While "a bus passenger clearly ex-
pects that his bag may be handled[, he] does not expect that other passengers or
bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory man-
ner."
129
The Chief Justice's entire opinion spans only three pages. The analysis it-
self consists of a single paragraph. At first glance, the question the case pres-
ents seems to be nothing more than a straightforward application of Fourth
Amendment principles. Upon closer examination, however, the opinion left
unanswered many difficult questions and studiously avoided even raising these
intractable problems.
Most notably, the majority opinion discussed exploratory tactile searches in
a vacuum without reference to context. Examine closely the Court's categorical
language:
When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other pas-
sengers or bus employees may move it for one reason or another. Thus, a bus pas-
senger clearly expects that his bag may be handled. He does not expect that other
passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an explora-
tory manner.... We therefore hold that the a1 ent's physical manipulation of peti-tioner's bag violated the Fourth Amendment.13
What is left unspoken, of course, is that not all bus passengers traveling under
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1465. In determining whether something constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes, the Court asks the following two questions: 1) whether the individual, by his conduct, has ex-
hibited an actual expectation of privacy; 2) whether the individual's expectation of privacy is "one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).





all circumstances have the same expectations and that not all such expectations
are objectively reasonable. Passengers traveling on a bus route that is known to
be crowded may well expect their bags to be not simply handled, but squeezed,
just as Bond's bag was. This situation is entirely plausible where passengers
have to stack their luggage on top of other passengers' bags. Just as a grocer
packs the sturdiest item first and places the lighter items on top, a considerate
fellow traveler may well need to squeeze another passenger's bag to see
whether the bag lying underneath-and the objects contained within-is strong
enough to support the weight of her own bulkier piece of luggage. It is there-
fore not surprising that "the trial court, which heard the evidence, saw nothing
unusual, unforeseeable, or special about this agent's squeeze."
'131
The Court's language seems to create nothing less than a per se rule,
prompting Justice Breyer's criticism in his dissenting opinion that the majority
opinion would lead to "a constitutional jurisprudence of 'squeezes." 1 32 If the
Court was serious about its reasonableness inquiry, it could not possibly have
been blind to such contextual nuances. Overturning the lower courts' factual
findings without so much as providing an explanation further validates Justice
Breyer's concern that the Court is merely creating yetanother ad hoc exception
in its patchwork Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Compounding the problem, the Court carelessly conflated two concepts-
(1) the degree of intrusiveness of a search and (2) what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy-that by no means always go together. Distinguishing
California v. Ciraolo133 and Florida v. Riley, 134 the Court emphasized that
these cases "involve only visual, as opposed to tactile observation. Physically
invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."',
35
The Court contrasted those cases with Terry v. Ohio,136 which noted that "a
careful tactile exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over
his or her body is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which
may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and is not to be un-
dertaken lightly."'
' 37
While it is generally true that the more intrusive the search, the less reason-
able it is for a passenger to have expected it-and thus the more likely it is for
the search to be held unconstitutional-intrusiveness is not equivalent to a pas-
senger's reasonable expectations. If, as the Court claimed, the question is
131. Id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1467.
133. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (upholding aerial observation of marijuana plants
in a backyard surrounded by a ten-foot fence).
134. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (upholding aerial observation of marijuana plants in a
greenhouse).
135. Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1464 (emphasis added).
136. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
137. Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1464 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18) (emphasis added).
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whether a reasonable passenger anticipates a certain type of invasion, focusing
too intently on intrusiveness may lead to the wrong answer.
To understand the difference between intrusiveness and expectation, com-
pare Bond with United States v. Place,138 in which the Supreme Court held
that the use of specially-trained dogs to sniff passengers' bags for hidden drugs
was not a search. 139 A line of reasoning focusing on the intrusiveness of a
search well supports the Court's holdings in both cases. Because a "tactile ex-
ploration" of a piece of luggage is more physically intrusive than a brief sniff
test by a dog, the latter can still be allowed even if the former violates Fourth
Amendment guarantees.
However, if the reasonableness inquiry is taken seriously-as the Court
claimed to, but did not-and asks what a passenger should reasonably expect
in terms of possible invasion of her privacy by members of the public, exactly
the opposite answer is reached. Having luggage manipulated and squeezed by
other passengers, whether it violates a passenger's reasonable expectation of
privacy or not, is surely much more ordinary than encountering dog owners
who let their dogs roam at large to "sniff at other's bags."' 140 To press the point
even further, it is almost impossible to maintain with a straight face that a pas-
senger should anticipate that, in the course of her travel, specially-trained dogs
will be present at passenger terminals, oblivious to everything except passen-
gers' baggage. If this is so, why should the police be allowed to employ sniff
dogs but not permitted to squeeze passengers' bags, especially when the Court
has long said that, in answering the question about what constitutes a reason-
able expectation of privacy, whether the invasion is carried out by law en-
forcement officials or members of the general public makes no difference?
14 1
Because the Bond Court was blind to the distinction between intrusiveness and
reasonableness and focused almost exclusively on the former factor at the ex-
pense of the latter, it failed to see that these two cases cannot be reconciled on
a reasonable expectation of privacy theory.
Its failure to do so carries important implications. Cases that are now de-
cided in favor of individuals' privacy interests may well come down differently
if an intrusiveness analysis is employed. Consider United States v. Taborda,
142
138. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); see Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1466-67 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (discussing Place's implications for the Bond majority's reasonableness analysis). For a pow-
erful general argument that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness and that the
Court has given short shrift to the reasonableness inquiry in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see
generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1-45
(1997); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994).
139. Place, 462 U.S. at 696-97.
140. Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. E.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) ("The police cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any mem-
ber of the public."), cited in Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980).
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in which the Second Circuit held that any enhanced viewing by means of a
telescope into the interior of a home impairs a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy. While it is debatable whether there is any "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to what can be seen by means of a long-familiar and gener-
ally used optical instrument,"' 43 there can be no debate that an observation by
telescope is not "physically intrusive." If degree of intrusiveness is the test, as
Bond's language suggests, the complexities of the case dissolve immediately,
and law enforcement interests dominate. The observation does not violate the
Fourth Amendment, because the observers are hundreds of feet away. How-
ever, if reasonableness is the test, there is a higher probability that individuals'
rights to privacy will be protected, as illustrated by the Second Circuit's dispo-
sition of the case.
In looking to the next Term, the importance of this distinction looms even
larger. In September 2000, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether law
enforcement officials' use of a thermal imaging device to detect illicit drug-
cultivation activities is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 44 If the intrusiveness reasoning prevails, the Court will likely reach the
same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit, namely that the device "intruded into
nothing"'145 and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. However,
the long-term result may well be to eviscerate the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment through a technological evasion.
The Court in the past has dealt with the impact of technological advances
on the Fourth Amendment. In Katz v. United States146 the Court was emphatic
in noting that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places.' ' 147 The
practical consequences of focusing solely on intrusiveness is to overturn sub
silentio this commitment to look at the purpose and abide by the spirit of the
Amendment.
V. ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW
In Illinois v. Wardlow,148 the Supreme Court essentially held that flight
from a police officer, by itself, justifies an investigative stop under Terry v.
Ohio.14 9 While there is something to be said for the common sense of this
holding, the decision still raises troubling questions about police power and
privacy. Like Bond, in Wardlow the Court considered the facts from a particu-
143. Id. at 141 (Dumbauld, J., dissenting).
144. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S.
Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-8508). A further discussion of this case appears infra at text accompanying
notes 255-264.
145. Id. at 1046.
146. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
147. Id. at 351.
148. Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
149. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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lar viewpoint, and the outcome was influenced greatly as a result.
A. The Facts and Lower Court Decisions
Illinois v. Wardlow arose out of a motion to suppress a handgun that was
found during a Terry stop-and-frisk search. The following are the only facts
that appear in the record: In 1995, two uniformed police officers were driving
in the last car of a four-car caravan when they observed Wardlow standing near
the front of a building with a white plastic bag. Wardlow, who was not violat-
ing any laws at the time, looked in the police officers' direction and then fled.
One of the officers stopped Wardlow and frisked him, before asking any ques-
tions. The officer felt a handgun inside the plastic bag, opened it, saw the gun,
and then arrested Wardlow. The trial court denied Wardlow's motion to sup-
press the handgun, and Wardlow was subsequently convicted of unlawful use
of a weapon by a felon.
150
The Appellate Court of Illinois suppressed the gun and accordingly over-
turned Wardlow's conviction. 15 It stated that the record did not support that
Wardlow was in a high crime area, 152 and consequently Wardlow's flight
alone was not enough to justify an investigative stop. 153 However, the court
was careful to limit its holding: "[W]e do not hold that the presence of a sus-
pect in a high crime location, together with his subsequent flight from the po-
lice, is never grounds for a Terry stop.... To pass constitutional muster, how-
ever, the high crime area should be a sufficiently localized and identifiable
location."' 154 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, but on different
grounds. 155 It stated that the undisputed testimony of a police officer estab-
lished that Wardlow was. in a high crime area. 156 However, the court affirmed,
because "an individual's flight upon the approach of a police vehicle patrolling
a high-crime area .... is insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of in-
volvement in criminal conduct."' 157 Since the arresting officer lacked "specific
facts corroborating the inference of guilt gleaned from [the] defendant's
flight,"'158 the stop was unjustified and the conviction had to be overturned.
150. People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65,66 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
151. Id. at 68.
152. Id. at 67.
153. Id. at 68.
154. Id.
155. People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484 (II1. 1998).
156. Id. at 486.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 489.
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B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Illinois Supreme Court's decision,
finding that the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion on which to base
his stop of Wardlow. 159 In doing so, Chief Justice Rehnquist's terse opinion
for the five-Justice majority never explicitly stated that flight alone is sufficient
for a Terry stop; however, the Court's language certainly conveys that impres-
sion. For instance, the Court characterized "headlong flight" as "the consum-
mate act of evasion," stating that while "it is not necessarily indicative of
wrongdoing... it is certainly suggestive of such."' 60 The Court also distin-
guished this case from Florida v. Royer,161 which held that a person stopped
by a police officer for questioning has the right to go about her business if she
does not wish to respond; 162 flight, the Court said, is "simply not a mere re-
fusal to cooperate," but "just the opposite" of going on with one's business.
163
Further, though the Court acknowledged the existence of innocent reasons for
flight, it characterized a Terry stop as a "far more minimal intrusion" than an
arrest,' 64 thus strongly implying that the risk is acceptable given flight's highly
suspicious nature.
In upholding Wardlow's conviction, the Court also noted that being in a
high-crime area is relevant to the Terry analysis. 165 This awareness of the cir-
cumstances of the stop was part of the Court's overall emphasis on "common-
sense judgments and inferences about human behavior" as determining the
lawfulness of Terry stops where flight is involved.
166
In contrast to the Court's brief opinion, Justice Stevens, in dissent,
discussed at length his agreement with what he characterized as the Court's re-
fusal to adopt a per se rule on flight and investigative stops.' 67 Justice Stevens
cataloged possible innocent reasons for flight, such as fear of being arrested as
a suspect, unwillingness to be a witness, fear of danger from criminal activity,
159. Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
160. Id.
161. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
162. Id. at 497-98.
163. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676.
164. Id. at 677.
165. Id. at 676 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)).
166. Id.
167. Both parties asked for per se rules. Illinois asked for a per se rule holding that unprovoked
flight from an identified police officer was always grounds for an investigative stop. Brief for Petitioner
at 5, Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000) (No. 98-1036), available at 1999 WL 451857 ("Peti-
tioner contends that a person's unprovoked flight at the mere sight of a police officer is such innately and
objectively suspicious behavior that it alone justifies a temporary investigative stop."). Wardlow asked
for a per se rule that flight, standing alone, was never sufficient grounds. Brief for Respondent at 4,
available at 1999 WL 607000 ("[T]he fact that a person in an undefined area flees from police is an in-
sufficiently articulated basis for a Terry stop."). As discussed, Illinois came closest to getting its wish.
Supra text accompanying notes 159-164.
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and fear of danger from confrontations between the police and criminals.' 68
Another reason, particularly for minorities and residents of high crime areas, is
fear of the police themselves. 169 In extensive footnotes, Justice Stevens cited a
number of studies documenting these fears. 170 Referring to the majority's
statement that scientific certainty of guilt cannot be demanded of officers and
judges,171 Stevens pointed out that scientific certainty of innocence cannot be
demanded either. 172  Justice Stevens thus lauded the totality of the circum-
stances test for all Terry stops.
173
Justice Stevens's acknowledged point of difference with the Court was the
application of the law to the facts of the case. Stevens saw too few facts to sup-
port a finding that the stop was reasonable: the officer could not recall whether
his car was marked; there was no evidence whether the other vehicles in the
caravan were marked or the other officers were in uniform; and it was not clear
if other people were in the area of the arrest, if that area was the caravan's des-
tination, how fast the officers were driving, or if the other vehicles in the cara-
van had already gone past.1 74 (Stevens noted that the Illinois Appellate Court
even refused to infer a relationship between Wardlow's flight and the police
officers' driving by. 175) Additionally, the other contextual elements, such as the
plastic bag, the time of day, and the lack of any called-in report of activity in
the area, did not support the stop.' 76 Finally, the area's high crime rate "argua-
bly makes an inference of guilt less appropriate, rather than more so," because
"many factors providing innocent motivations for unprovoked flight are con-
centrated in high crime areas. 177 At any rate, the fact of a high crime area is
"a fact too generic" to provide the specific reasons that justify a Terry stop. 178
Justice Stevens summed up his viewpoint by saying, "I am not persuaded that
the mere fact that someone standing on a sidewalk looked in the direction of a
passing car before starting to run is sufficient to justify a forcible stop and
frisk."
179
168. Id. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 680-81.
170. Id. at 680-82 nn.7-12.
171. Id. at 676.
172. Id. at681-82.
173. Id. at 682 ("[T]he Court is surely correct in refising to embrace either per se rule offered by
the parties. The totality of circumstances, as always, must dictate the result.").
174. Id. at 683-84.







C. Analysis: Characterizing Parties and Precedent
The crucial difference between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stev-
ens' opinions seems to be, quite simply, their attitude toward law enforcement.
For instance, the Court spoke almost entirely from the point of view of the of-
ficers when describing the facts, stating, for instance, that "it was not merely
[Wardlow's] presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the
officers' suspicion but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police."'180 The
Court looked at the police officers' reactions to Wardlow, and very rarely at
Wardlow's reactions to the police. There is one nod to the perspective of the
person stopped, the acknowledgment that it is "undoubtedly true" that "there
are innocent reasons for flight from police"; however, the Court immediately
went on to note that this fact does not necessarily mean that the Fourth
Amendment is violated. 181 In contrast, Justice Stevens extensively catalogued
those innocent reasons in his dissenting opinion, viewing the situation through
the eyes of the person on the street and not those of the police officer.182 The
two viewpoints are not mutually exclusive, and both make common sense, but
the two opinions restrict themselves to just one side of the story.
The viewpoints of the Justices naturally correspond to the skepticism with
which they greeted the officers' contention that they based their search of
Wardlow on a reasonable suspicion. Justice Stevens argued that the record was
factually insufficient to support the conviction; he cited about a dozen facts
that either were not mentioned on the record or were not, in his view, suspi-
cious. 83 The Court discussed none of these omissions, apparently considering
none of them significant, but instead found that "commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior" justified the stop. 184 One's choice of view-
point is naturally linked to one's perspective, particularly in an adversarial pro-
ceeding.
A related difference between the opinions is their characterization of Terry
stops. The Court characterized Terry as holding that "an officer may, consistent
with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the offi-
cer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.'
185
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, described Terry far more narrowly, claim-
ing that it provides "only a 'narrowly drawn authority' that is 'limited to that
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons,"",186 and noting that "a Terry
180. Id. at 676.
181. Id. at 677.
182. Id. at 678-82; see also supra text accompanying notes 167-173.
183. Id. at 683-84; see also supra text accompanying notes 174-178.
184. Id. at 676.
185. Id. at 675.
186. Id. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968)); see also
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frisk 'is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person."" 87 By character-
izing Terry in this way, Justice Stevens brought out an issue the Court deliber-
ately avoided: the implications of a frisk taking place during the Terry stop.
Clearly, the more invasive the intrusion, the more seriously the Court will
scrutinize the justification for it. The Court claimed it "express[ed] no opinion
as to the lawfulness of the frisk independently of the stop" because the Court
had not granted certiorari on that question.188 However, the Court's language
does suggest approval of the police officer's frisk; it stated that the officer
"immediately conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in
his experience it was common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of
narcotics transactions." 189 Indeed, Justice Stevens took it for granted that the
frisk is part and parcel of the stop, stating that he did not feel that unprovoked
flight "is sufficient to justify a forcible stop and frisk."' 190 Realistically, it does
seem likely that most people stopped under Terry may be frisked, if someone
like Wardlow-suspected of a narcotics offense, not a violent crime-may
be.' 91 Why did the Court downplay Terry's emphasis on frisks and the strong
possibility of frisks in cases like Wardlow's? By claiming that frisks are not an
issue, the Court greatly reduced the level of intrusion into an individual's pri-
vacy. With the privacy interest thus minimized, the majority was more easily
able to adopt law enforcement's point of view, to the exclusion of the defen-
dant's. This analysis does not suggest causation; that is, the Court was not nec-
essarily describing Terry in a narrow way in order to reach the result it wanted.
However, the confluence of these attitudes is another example of the Court's
recent tendency to restrict the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protections.
In sum, Wardlow expanded the ability of the police to make Terry stops by
allowing unprovoked flight to serve as a basis for an investigatory stop. Fur-
ther, such stops are almost certain to be accompanied by frisks, increasing the
effective power of the police and the intrusion on the individual's privacy. The
Court did not state any of these inferences outright, however, and by not
drawing the obvious conclusion, it avoided balancing the more serious privacy
interest in a pat-down search against the law enforcement interest that it is
clearly inclined to favor. Wardlow took a selective approach to the points of
view it considered, both in terms of the actors in the case and its characteriza-
tion of precedent, and thereby reached a result that, on the whole, benefits law
Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk's Per-
spective, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 891, 896 (1998) (noting, as the law clerk who worked with Chief Jus-
tice Warren on Terry, that the Court "declined to reach the issue of the power to 'stop,"' only approving
protective searches).
187. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 678 n.1 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17).
188. Id. at 676 n.2.
189. Id. at 675.
190. Id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Dudley, supra note 186, at 897 ("[T]he power to 'frisk' [and] the power to 'stop' for investi-




VI. FLORIDA V. J.L.
In Florida v. JL., 192 the Supreme Court unanimously determined that an
anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is insufficient to justify a police
officer's stop and frisk of that person. This case built on existing precedent to
specify another situation in which privacy rights would be protected.
A. The Case and Its Holding
In October 1995, the Miami-Dade Police Department received an anony-
mous call stating that "a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and
wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun."'193 Officers arrived at the bus stop
and saw three black males, of whom one, fifteen-year-old J.L., was wearing a
plaid shirt. One of the officers stopped J.L., frisked him, and seized a gun from
his pocket. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a li-
cense and with possessing a firearm while under the age of 18.194 The trial
court granted J.L.'s motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful
search. The Florida Court of Appeal reversed, 195 and the Supreme Court of
Florida quashed the intermediate decision and held the search invalid under the
Fourth Amendment. 
96
Under Terry v. Ohio197 and its progeny, a police officer is permitted to per-
form a stop-and-frisk search if that officer "has reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual."' 98 Initially, the Court was
skeptical that an anonymous tip could create the necessary reasonable suspi-
cion to support a Terry stop, noting that "an anonymous tip alone seldom dem-
onstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity." 199 However, it sub-
sequently recognized that "there are situations in which an anonymous tip,
suitably corroborated, exhibits 'sufficient indicia of reliability to provide rea-
sonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop."'
200
Writing for the Court in JL., Justice Ginsburg reasoned that "[t]he anony-
mous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive information and therefore left
the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility.",
20 1
192. Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1377 (2000).
193. Id. at 1377.
194. Id.
195. State v. J.L., 689 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
196. J.L. v. State, 727 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1998).
197. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
198. Id. at 27.
199. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972).
200. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1378 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)).
201. Id. at 1379.
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Ginsburg explained that even when an anonymous tip accurately describes a
subject's location and appearance, such a tip "does not show that the tipster has
knowledge of concealed criminal activity," and therefore does not contain suf-
ficient indicia of reliability to create a reasonable suspicion. 20 2 The J.L. Court
refused to modify Terry's requirement of reasonable suspicion by creating a
"firearm exception" under which "a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a
stop and frisk even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability
testing.
' 203
This unanimous holding did not stray far from precedent. In Alabama v.
White, the Court had decided that an anonymous tip met the reasonable suspi-
cion standard because it accurately predicted details of a suspect's future ac-
tions.204 The White Court warned, however, that it was a "close case," 20 5 and
apparently the anonymous tip in JL.-which predicted nothing at all-went
over the line into unreliability. Both Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court
and Justice Kennedy's concurrence discussed issues similar to White's concern
about the unreliability of bare-boned anonymous tips. These concerns are ex-
amined next.
B. Tip Reliability and "Reasonable Suspicion"
Whether an anonymous tip meets the "reasonable suspicion" standard de-
pends on the reliability of the tip. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy
described why anonymous tips pose a unique reliability problem: "If the tele-
phone call is truly anonymous, the informant has not placed his credibility at
risk and can lie with impunity."206 Kennedy concluded that with anonymous
tips, "the risk of fabrication becomes unacceptable."
20 7
Kennedy suggested ways that an anonymous tip might acquire the requisite
reliability for a stop-and-frisk search. First, the tip might be reliable if the same
anonymous tipster had given reliable tips on other occasions. 20 8 Second, the
tip might acquire reliability if it accurately predicted some future conduct of
the alleged criminal.20 9 Kennedy reasoned, "if an unnamed caller with a voice
which sounds the same each time tells police on two successive nights about
criminal activity which in fact occurs each night, a similar call on the third
night ought not be treated automatically like the tip in the case now before
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. White, 496 U.S. at 332.
205. Id.






us. 210 In this example, "there would be a plausible argument that experience
cures some of the uncertainty surrounding the anonymity."
2 11
Alternatively, an "anonymous" tip might acquire sufficient reliability if it is
less than completely anonymous. Kennedy described a scenario where "an un-
named person driving a car the police officer later describes stops for a mo-
ment and, face to face, informs the police that criminal activity is occurring. 2 12
In such a situation, "a tip might be considered anonymous but nevertheless suf-
ficiently reliable to justify a proportionate police response." 2 13 Kennedy also
suggested that if the police had the ability to trace anonymous telephone in-
formants, and the public was aware of this ability, lying tipsters would be dis-
couraged and anonymous tips would tend to be more reliable.
2 14
In summary, Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy agreed that tipster reliability
determines whether an anonymous tip meets the "reasonable suspicion" stan-
dard. Police officers who receive an anonymous tip over the telephone know
practically nothing about the tipster and therefore have no grounds on which to
judge the tipster's credibility. Justice Kennedy suggested various ways in
which the tipster could acquire credibility: through giving tips that later proved
accurate, predicting future behavior of the suspect, or personally appearing to
the police but remaining anonymous.
C. Police Reliability
Two significant issues lurked in the background of Florida v. JL. These is-
sues were mentioned in briefs submitted by the parties and amici and were
considered by the Justices during oral argument, but were not squarely ad-
dressed by either of the opinions. First is the issue of law enforcement's reli-
ability. Second is the question of whether "reasonable suspicion" depends in
part on the gravity of the threatened harm.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, did not discuss whether the reli-
ability of the police-in addition to the reliability of the tip-was considered in
deciding the case. If police are justified in performing a stop-and-frisk search
on the basis of an anonymous tip, unscrupulous officers might fabricate tips
before or after the search. When required to account for performing an illegal
search, an officer could explain that she had received an anonymous tip that
described the suspect's appearance and stated that the suspect was carrying a
gun. Because such a tip would bear so little information, and would be placed
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suspect's actual location and appearance when asked to justify the search.
Further, with so few detaiis, it might be difficult to expose an officer's lie. An
alternative method of fabrication would be to have one police officer call an-
other with an anonymous tip; as one Justice remarked during oral argument, "it
would be pretty neat for the tipster to be another policeman."
21 5
Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest this issue by writing that "even if the
officer's testimony about receipt of the tip is found credible, there is a second
layer of inquiry respecting the reliability of the informant that cannot be pur-
sued., 216 Kennedy's apparent concern about police reliability is consistent
with his suggestions as to how an anonymous tip may become reliable. If the
tipster had called in the past and left accurate tips, there would possibly be
some records of the police having received the earlier tips, considered them,
and acted on them. Just as an officer might lie in saying that she received an
anonymous phone call, so might she lie in stating that an anonymous individual
drove up and gave a tip in person. However, where "an unnamed person
driv[es] a car the police officer later describes"217 and provides a tip, the offi-
cer will have to fabricate more information-what the person looked like, what
sort of car she was driving, and where the meeting occurred-thus subjecting
the officer's lie to a greater risk of exposure on cross-examination. In the same
manner, police could fabricate after the search a tip that made some accurate
predictions, but such a fabrication would again require a more complex lie. Fi-
nally, the use of instant caller identification or voice recording of telephone tips
leaves a record that discourages police fabrication. Indeed, these devices do
more to vouch for the reliability of police than the reliability of the tipster, who
might not even know about them. Despite these ways in which the safeguards
for tip reliability also serve as safeguard for police reliability, neither Justice
Ginsburg nor Justice Kennedy explicitly raised the issue of whether police reli-
ability was a factor to be weighed in deciding the outcome of the case.
D. Gravity of Harm and "Reasonable Suspicion"
A second significant question presented to the Court in J.L. was whether
the gravity of the threatened harm is relevant to meeting the reasonable suspi-
cion standard. In determining whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify
a stop-and-frisk search on the basis of an anonymous tip, the majority and con-
curring opinions focused primarily on the issue of reliability. The Court spe-
cifically declined to address whether reasonable suspicion might also be de-
termined by the gravity of the threatened harm:
215. Florida v. J.L, transcript of oral argument, 2000 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 3 (Feb. 29, 2000), at *43
[hereinafter J.L. transcript].




The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under
which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a
search even without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a re-
port of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for
a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally con-
duct a frisk.
2 18
Justice Ginsburg's statement seems to suggest that there are indeed circum-
stances where the threatened harm overrides the traditional requirements of re-
liability.
In refusing to answer the gravity-of-harm question in Florida v. J.L., the
Court walked a tightrope between following its prior "probable cause" juris-
prudence and allowing law enforcement greater flexibility to respond to risks
of violence. On one hand, to admit that gravity of harm was a factor of reason-
able suspicion would set apart the reasonable suspicion doctrine from the prob-
able cause standard required for full-fledged searches. The probable cause re-
quirement, derived from the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
"unreasonable" searches and seizures, does not become less stringent even
when law enforcement believes that the suspect may cause serious harm.219
On the other hand, the case of Florida v. J.L. made its way through the
courts during a time of alarming gun violence in schools. Among the incidents
were the April 1999 shootings at Columbine High School, mentioned by one
Justice during oral argument, 22  in which thirteen people were killed and
221twenty-three wounded before the two armed students killed themselves. Oral
argument before the Supreme Court was held on February 29, 2000, the same
day a six-year-old boy allegedly shot and killed a six-year-old classmate at
Buell Elementary School in Mount Morris Township, Michigan.
222
Although the Court refused to provide a clear statement on the gravity-of-
harm issue, it addressed anxieties about future school shooting sprees by re-
marking that the decision does not prevent school administrators from search-
ing students, based on anonymous tips, to protect the safety of other students at
218. Id. at 1380.
219. One Justice highlighted this jurisprudential problem during oral argument:
We don't say, [in determining whether the probable cause standard has been met,] if there's a
really serious threat to the public involved you don't need the same degree of probable cause.
We haven't said that.... But if the principle is valid I don't know why it wouldn't apply to
[the reasonable suspicion standard] as to [the probable cause standard].
JL. transcript, supra note 215, at *6-7.
220. Id. at *38.
221. E.g., James Brooke, Terror in Littleton: The Overview; 2 Students in Colorado School Said to
Gun Down as Many as 23 and Kill Themselves in a Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at Al; Judith
Graham, Massacre Shatters School: 'You Feel You're in a Nightmare,' CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 1999, at 1;
Tom Kenworthy, Up to 25 Die in Colorado School Shooting; Two Student Gunmen Are Found Dead,
WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at Al.
222. E.g., Peter Slevin and William Claiborne, First-Grader Kills Classmate, CHIC. SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2000, at 28; Peggy Walsh-Samecki et al., First-Grade Girl Shot and Killed in Michigan School
by 6-Year-Old Classmate, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 1, 2000, LEXIS, News Directory.
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schools. Justice Ginsburg stated that the Court did not "hold that public safety
officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of Fourth Amendment
privacy is diminished.., such as schools, cannot conduct protective searches
on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere. ' 223 De-
spite the "serious threat that armed criminals pose to public safety"224 and the
recent rash of school yard shooting sprees-a fact raised during oral argument
but not mentioned in the opinions-the Court recognized that "an automatic
firearm exception to our established reliability analysis would rove too far....
enabl[ing] any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive,
embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing an anony-
mous call falsely reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun."225 Overall,
by remaining well within the constraints of precedent and not allowing recent
public tragedies to affect its institutional role, the Court supported existing pri-
vacy rights by refusing to hold that the gravity of the threatened harm had any
bearing on the calculation of "reasonable suspicion."
VII. CONCLUSION
A superficial look at the October 1999 Term might indicate that the Court
was more receptive to privacy interests than it has been in recent years. After
all, three of the four cases held that an individual's privacy interest should
trump law enforcement's interest. Flippo rejected a general crime scene ex-
emption to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 226 Bond refused to
allow law enforcement officials to search passengers' luggage by squeezing the
bags' outsides. 22 Florida v. J.L. held that an anonymous tip that simply de-
scribed a person's race, approximate age, and clothing did not justify a Terry
stop-and-frisk search.22 8 Only Wardlow came out in favor of law enforcement,
holding that unprovoked flight justified a Terry stop.229 Indeed, one popular
account characterized the decisions as "a modest reversal" in the Court's trend
of favoring law enforcement, stating that these cases "suggest the court has be-
come increasingly suspicious about some new, aggressive techniques police
are using to counter drugs and gun violence."
230
However, this superficial assessment overlooks the two key elements that
color the Supreme Court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment: precedent and
point of view. Viewed in this light, the Court has not retreated from its recent
223. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1380.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1379-80.
226. Supra note 80 and accompanying text.
227. Supra note 124 and accompanying text.
228. Supra note 192 and accompanying text.
229. Supra note 148 and accompanying text.
230. Joan Biskupic, Justices to Examine Police Power, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 2000, at 3A.
Vol. 19:197, 2000
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trend of favoring law enforcement.
The first of these elements is precedent. Both Flippo231 and Florida v.
J.L.232 are very similar to prior decisions of the Court, decisions that happened
to be rendered when the Court had a more expansive notion of the Fourth
Amendment's protections. In Flippo, the Court simply reversed a decision that
"squarely conflict[ed] with Mincey v. Arizona," which was a 1978 case that
"rejected the contention that there is a 'murder scene exception'' to the Fourth
Amendment. 233 The precedent of Mincey was so clear that the Court decided
the case per curiam, the only one of this Term's Fourth Amendment cases to
have done so. Likewise, Florida v. J.L. rested firmly on an established line of
cases requiring indicia of reliability in a tip before police perform an investi-
gatory stop.234 The Court simply looked at the facts to determine whether this
case possessed "the moderate indicia of reliability present in White," and then
held that it did not.235 It also declined to modify its precedent, rejecting a
"firearm exception ' 236 to the rule of White.
The Court's deference to precedent is well known. Perhaps the best known
statement of this interest is found in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 2 7 which
238upheld Roe v. Wade. In Section III of the Court's opinion, Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter spent fifteen pages discussing the importance
of stare decisis, 239 concluding that "[a] decision to overrule Roe's essential
holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there
was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's le-
gitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law."240 A similar
tribute to stare decisis, complete with lukewarm support for the precedent be-
ing upheld, can be found in the recent Dickerson v. United States,24 1 which
rejected a challenge to the famed Miranda v. Arizona.242 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that Congress could not override
Miranda with legislation 243 because Miranda announced a constitutional
231. Flippo v. West Virginia, 120 S. Ct. 7 (1999).
232. Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000).
233. Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 8.
234. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1378 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990); Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972)).
235. Id. at 1379.
236. Id.
237. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
238. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
239. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-69. Though some of the joint opinion in Casey was not joined by a
majority, Part III was joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun and therefore is part of the opinion of
the Court. Id. at 843.
240. Id. at 869.
241. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
242. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
243. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
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rule.244 Further, "[w]hether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning
and its resulting rule, were we deciding the issue in the first instance, the prin-
ciples of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now." 245 Justice
Scalia reacted to the majority's treatment of stare decisis by writing a blistering
dissent accusing the Court of engaging in intellectual dishonesty and power-
grabbing;246 one might disagree with the strength of Justice Scalia's feeling and
still agree that Dickerson is hard to reconcile, at best, with prior Supreme Court
cases characterizing Miranda as an extra-constitutional rule.2 47 Deference to
precedent is the strongest, and perhaps the only, explanation for the result in
Dickerson.
Thus, the Court has shown reluctance to deviate from its settled precedent
even when it clearly disapproves of the substance of that precedent. It is there-
fore unsurprising that it would spurn challenges to fairly uncontroversial deci-
sions such as Mincey and White. Since the Court's institutional biases explain
its apparent lean toward privacy interests in Flippo and JL., they offer little
insight into the Court's present direction when faced with new situations.
248 249The other two cases, Wardlow 8 and Bond, indicate how the Court treats
Fourth Amendment issues that are not closely governed by precedent: Its deci-
sions are strongly molded by the Court's choosing to assume one particular
point of view out of a number of options.2 This pattern is most evident in
Wardlow, which was an open question; no prior Supreme Court precedent ad-
dressed whether flight satisfied the criteria for a Terry stop.251 There, the
Court and Justice Stevens spoke from entirely different perspectives on the is-
sue: The Court viewed the street encounter almost solely through the eyes of
the arresting officer, while Justice Stevens extensively catalogued the things
244. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
245. Id.
246. Justice Scalia claimed that "a majority of the Court does not believe" that custodial interroga-
tion without Miranda warnings violates the Constitution, id. at 2337, and only upheld Miranda to "im-
pose its Court-made code upon the States" in a "very Cheops' Pyramid... of judicial arrogance," id. at
2348.
247. E.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (majority opinion by Rehnquist, J.); see also
Linda Greenhouse, A Turf Battle's Unlikely Victim, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at A20 (noting that
"Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the court ... was notable because it placed him so strikingly
against type ... [as] one of [Miranda's] most outspoken critics").
248. Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
249. Bond v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1462 (2000).
250. Scholars have noted this tendency in the Court's opinions on other subjects. For instance, one
author points out that McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), "review[ed] the claim of racially biased
capital sentencing with no reference to the perspective of blacks, either as crime victims or as victims of
discrimination"; the majority looked only at the perspectives of criminal defendants, criminal justice
decision makers, law enforcement, and legislatures. Peggy C. Davis, Popular Legal Culture: Law as
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1573 (1989). Davis goes on to note that while the dissent spoke
powerfully from the defendant's viewpoint, it still did not consider other victims of racial discrimina-
tion. Id. at 1574-75.




that might have been going through the defendant's mind as he fled.252 In
Bond as well, the Court clearly envisioned a particular sort of encounter, which
seems to have influenced its perhaps surprising decision. In talking about a
person's privacy expectation in his personal luggage, the Court thought only of
the situation in the case, and, as discussed,253 it failed to acknowledge that
traveling experiences might differ. Travel by bus, train, or plane is something
that all of the Justices almost certainly have experienced; thus, they are more
likely to easily imagine themselves in the place of the defendant, watching
some strange person squeeze his luggage to figure out what is inside-contex-
tual imagining that leads the Court to acknowledge the strength of people's
privacy interest in their bags. One might speculate that, as seems highly likely,
the Justices making up the majority in Wardlow have never feared or run from
the police in their lives, and thus never even think of flight as something other
than "certainly suggestive" of wrongdoing.254 Thus, it seems that when the
Court is not constrained by its institutional bias towards stare decisis, its rea-
soning is colored by a tendency to see the facts from a limited number of view-
points-to the possible exclusion of recognizing the full complexity of the
contextual problems it confronts.
With this analysis in mind, the October 2000 Term presents several in-
triguing cases. As this Article goes to press, the Court has granted certiorari to
five Fourth Amendment cases, which have serious implications both in them-
selves and as battlegrounds for the competing interests of precedent and point
of view.
For instance, the shadow of Katz v. United States255 hangs heavily over the
most recent case to be granted certiorari, United States v. Kyllo. 256 Like Katz,
Kyllo considers whether use of a new technology-in this case, a thermal im-
aging device-violated an individual's expectation of privacy. 257 The Court of
Appeals in Kyllo held that the defendant did not have a subjective expectation
of privacy in the levels of heat emitted from his home,258 but that even if he
had, that expectation would not have been objectively reasonable. 259 It there-
252. Supra text accompanying notes 180-182.
253. Supra text accompanying notes 130-13 1.
254. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676.
255. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
256. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S.
Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-8508).
257. Kyllo was arrested for and convicted of manufacturing marijuana. Part of the evidence against
him was a thermal image of his home, which showed high heat loss from one area of Kyllo's home; the
police interpreted this as indicating that Kyllo was using high intensity lights to grow marijuana indoors.
Id. at 1043-44. The court noted that a thermal imaging device "passively records [and] act[s] much like a
camera." Id. at 1044.
258. Id. at 1046 ("Kyllo made no attempt to conceal these emissions, demonstrating a lack of con-
cern with the heat emitted and a lack of subjective privacy expectation in the heat.").
259. Id. at 1047 ("[W]e cannot conclude that this surveillance was 'so revealing of intimate details
as to raise constitutional concerns."' (quoting Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238
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fore found that the thermal image did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 260
Judge Noonan, in dissent, claimed that the majority completely failed to put
themselves in the homeowner's shoes when analyzing his subjective privacy
expectation. 26 1 Noonan also reached back to Katz to argue that this subjective
expectation is reasonable: "[I]n Katz, the focus [was] on the phone conversa-
tion, not on... the vibrations actually picked up by the bug," 262 and like
phone conversations, there are many heat-generating activities that are inno-
263cent and have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Will the Supreme Court
seize on the point of view espoused by the Court of Appeals' majority in order
to distinguish Katz and favor law enforcement, or will the impulse to cleave to
a seminal case prove stronger? The fact that Katz is not under direct attack, as
264Dickerson was, may make the desire to uphold precedent less strong; the
more accurate parallel may be to Wardlow, where the general principle (rea-
sonable suspicion in one, expectation of privacy in the other) meets a novel set
of facts (unprovoked flight, thermal imaging) and is restricted as a result. This
case will be closely watched, deservedly, to determine if the spirit of Katz will
animate the Court's look at present-day technology.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista2 65 is another case in which precedent and
questions of point-of-view ought to mix interestingly. Atwater was arrested,
handcuffed, and jailed for an hour because she and her children were not
wearing seat belts.266 The arresting officer apparently had a prior history of
267animosity towards Atwater. A divided Court of Appeals, hearing the case
en banc, held that because the arrest was based on probable cause, and because
it was not "conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an in-
dividual's privacy or even physical interests," the arrest did not violate the
Constitution. 268 However, neither the majority's precedents nor the dissent's
are directly on point, 269 thus making it more likely that the highly striking
(1986))).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1049 (arguing that "[t]he homeowner's expectation is directed to the privacy of the inte-
rior of his home," and heat emissions are only observable by "amplification of the senses by technol-
ogy" which "defeat[s] the homeowner's expectation") (Noonan, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 1050.
263. Judge Noonan listed as examples "the use of a sauna in a sauna room; the making of ceramics
in a kiln in the basement; the hothouse cultivation of orchids, poinsettias or other plants in a domestic
greenhouse." Id.
264. Supra text accompanying notes 241-247.
265. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3789
(U.S. June 26, 2000) (No. 99-1408).
266. Id. at 244.
267. Id. at 248 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 244-45.
269. E.g., id. at 251 n.3 (noting that the majority relies on dicta in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 818 (1996), that addressed a traffic stop only, not an arrest) (Wiener, J., dissenting); id. at 248-50
(finding that there was no legitimate government interest in arresting Atwater by applying Terry and
cases regarding positive reasons to arrest a person).
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facts of the case may sway the Court's analysis. Like traveling with luggage in
Bond, driving is a very common experience, and the Justices may very well
have either personal experience with traffic stops or the ability to imagine
them, and therefore may be inclined to empathize with the defendant.
2 70
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond271 is a significant case in which, unusually,
precedent has already determined the specific point of view the Court takes. At
issue are drug roadblocks, in which police stop cars at roadblocks, ask the driv-
ers for driver's licenses and registrations, look through the car windows, and
have a drug-sniffing dog smell the outside of the car.272 Here, the approach to
precedent will likely determine the outcome of the case, because though prece-
dent requires an inquiry into the "subjective intrusion-the generating of con-
cern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers," 273 the Court has already
stepped into the traveler's shoes and decided that the intrusiveness of road-
27427block stops is acceptable, though not unanimously.275
The Supreme Court can choose from two very different approaches to its
jurisprudence in the Court of Appeals' decision in Edmond. Chief Judge Pos-
ner, writing for the majority, presumed that the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is based on the principle that reasonable searches
"ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing"; 276 he
concluded that the Indianapolis roadblock was unlawful because it did not fit
any exceptions to this principle, including other roadblock cases.277 Judge
Easterbrook, on .the other hand, argued that "[i]nterpretation of the fourth
270. For an example of empathizing with the defendant, see Justice Reynaldo Garza's dissenting
remark: "I have been a Texas lawyer for over sixty years and a Article III judge in Texas for over thirty-
eight years. I think I can take judicial notice of the fact that in a regular traffic stop ... the usual proce-
dure ... is to give the accused a citation." Id. at 246.
271. Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom City of Indian-
apolis v. Edmond, 68 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2000) (No. 99-1030).
272. Id. at 661.
273. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (upholding border checkpoints
looking for illegal immigrants).
274. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoints
because, in part, the level of intrusion is "appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop" than for a
roving stop (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 478 U.S. at 558)).
275. Id. at 463-466 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that because the checkpoints in Sitz were set
up by surprise and almost always operated at night, they were more intrusive than the fixed border
checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte).
276. Edmond, 183 F.3d at 662 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997)).
277. Chief Judge Posner finds four exceptions:
The first exception, illustrated by the roadblock set up to catch a. fleeing criminal, is when
there is a suspect ... but it is infeasible to avoid an indiscriminate search and seizure of other
persons .... The second exception, illustrated by the hypothetical dynamite case, is where no
specific person is under suspicion but the circumstances make it impossible to prevent a crime
without an indiscriminate search. The third exception is the regulatory search, the objective of
which is to protect a specific activity rather than to operate as an adjunct to general criminal
law enforcement. The last exception is the prevention of illegal importation whether of per-
sons (a power limited to the federal government) or of goods.
Id. at 665-66 (citations omitted).
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amendment is not a model of intellectual consistency," 278 and therefore "[t]o
figure out how to handle a roadblock case, we must look at how the Supreme
Court has handled other roadblock cases." 279 He applied these roadblock cases
to find that, under their balancing tests, the Indianapolis roadblocks are consti-
tutional. There are a number of possible reasons why the Court might favor one
of these views over the other, but since the Court has already settled the point-
of-view question, the question of precedent will be dispositive.
280
The two remaining cases are considered briefly. Illinois v. McArthur
28 1
considers whether a police officer may prevent a person from re-entering his
residence unsupervised while waiting for a search warrant, in order to preserve
evidence inside the residence. 282 The case offers the Court an opportunity to
283revisit Segura v. United States, an opinion that also dealt with securing an
apartment while waiting for a search warrant, but that lacked a clear holding.284
The final Fourth Amendment case before the Court is Ferguson v. City of
Charleston. 285 The plaintiffs in this case challenged a state hospital program
that tested pregnant women for cocaine use, without their consent or knowl-
edge, if they were suspected of drug use; positive results were sometimes re-
286ported to law enforcement. The Fourth Circuit held that the tests were rea-
sonable under the special needs doctrine, which recognizes that there are
"special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement"
which sometimes permit warrantless searches. 287 Unfortunately, though
Ferguson is an important and interesting case, the special needs doctrine is
somewhat outside the scope of this Article. However, a key dispute in the
Court of Appeals opinion was the goal of the policy. The majority, upholding
the policy, characterized it as seeking solely to improve the health of new-
278. Id. at 668 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 669.
280. As this Article was going to press, the Court held oral arguments in Edmond. According to
one news report, "[d]uring a spirited discussion ... the justices also wrestled with the fact that none of
their previous roadblock decisions precisely corresponds with the situation in this case." Charles Lane,
Court Hears Argument Over Anti-Drug Tactics, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2000, at A 19.
281. Illinois v. McArthur, 713 N.E.2d 93 (I11. App. Ct. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3684
(U.S. May 1, 2000) (No. 99-1132).
282. Id. at 95.
283. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
284. Part IV of the opinion contained the holding ("We hold, therefore, that securing a dwelling, on
the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is
being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents." Id. at 810), but
was joined by only Justice O'Connor.
285. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3550
(U.S. Feb. 28, 2000) (No. 99-936).
286. Id. at 474-75. The plaintiffs had also challenged the program on Title VI, privacy, and state
tort grounds, all of which were rejected. Id. at 476. Certiorari was sought only on the Fourth Amend-
ment issue. Brief for Petitioners at 19 n. 14, Ferguson v. City of Charleston (U.S. 2000) (No. 99-936).




borns; 288 the dissent argued that the policy-makers were primarily focused on
law enforcement and thus the special needs doctrine did not support the
searches.289 The Court's assumption of some or all of the parties' points-of-
view is likely to influence its views on the special needs doctrine's application,
and as already seen, the Court has tended to side with the government recently.
Being a pregnant cocaine user, unlike being a traveler with luggage or, per-
haps, a car driver, seems less likely to be an exception to this trend.
What does the future hold for the Fourth Amendment? If the October 1999
Term is any indication, quite simply, it holds more of the same. Despite the su-
perficial indications, the Rehnquist Court continues to weigh law enforcement
interests more heavily than privacy interests, except when precedent or a mo-
ment of personal empathy with the defendant constraints it. However, since the
Justices appear to draw on their own experiences when choosing which shoes
to put themselves in, these moments of personal empathy--of truly under-
standing the context of a person's privacy expectation and actions-are fairly
rare. Thus, unless the Court's personnel or temperament changes, it will likely
continue to restrict the scope of Fourth Amendment freedoms.
288. Id. at 475 n.3 ("[T]he record is abundantly clear that [the policy-makers] were motivated by a
desire to protect the health of children born" at the hospital.).
289. Id. at 484 ("[lilt nevertheless is clear from the record that an initial and continuing focus of the
policy was on the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing mothers...") (Blake, J., dissenting).

